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Fringe Benefits, Proposed Section 84,
and Tax Policy
The question of whether or not to include fringe benefits in the gross in-
come of an employee has been a much disputed subject. The author exam-
ines a recent proposed addition to the Internal Revenue Code which, if
adopted, would result in an increase in inclusion of items of fringe bene-
fits. Analyzing this proposed section from both a tax policy and effciency
standpoint, the author concludes that the proposed section is a movement
in the right direction of fairness but perhaps does not go far enough.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Scope
The currents of controversy surrounding the question of the in-
clusion of certain nonstatutory employee fringe benefits in the
gross income of the employee, have generated extensive discus-
sion among legal scholars,' and within the administrative 2 and
legislative 3 branches of government. It is well recognized that the
1. Chiara, Fringe Benefit Problems for Employer and Employee, 29 TAX.
EXEC. 165 (1977); Friedrich, Fringe Benefits: Compensation Techniques and Princi-
ples, 35 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX 1555 (1977); Hait, Employee Fringe Benefits: At-
tention to Tax Benefits Can 'Sweeten the Pot' at Low Cost, 6 TAX. FOR LAWYERS 110
(1977); Handler, Fringe Benefits and The S.E.C. Disclosure Rules, 37 N.Y.U. INST. OF
FED. TAX 31 (1979); Hanson & Harnick, Executive 'Percs' and Personal Income
Taxes, 56 HARv. Bus. REV. 20 (1978); Hickman, The Outlook for Fringe Benefits, 29
U. So. CAL. INST. ON FED. TAX 459 (1977); Keller, The Tax Consequences of Interest-
Free Loans from Corporations to Shareholders and from Employers to Employees,
19 BOST. C. L. REV. 231 (1978); Law, Fringe Benefits: Proposed Treasury Regulation
Section 1.61-16, U.S.F.L. REV. 198 (1976); Nolan, Taxation of Fringe Benefits, 30
NAT'L TAX J. 359 (1977); Overbeck, Fringe Benefits for Rank and File Employees, 55
TAXES 820 (1977); Warble, Taxation of Fringe Benefits and Perquisites, 36 N.Y.U.
INST. ON FED. TAX 693 (1976); Wasserman, Principles in Taxation of Nonstatutory
Fringe Benefits, 32 TAX LAWYER 137 (1978); Wasserman, Proposed Reg. Sec. 1.61-16:
An Example of Administrative Overreaching, 56 TAXES 243 (1978); Weisman, A
Model for the Equitable Taxation of Fringe Benefits, 56 TAXES 347 (1978); Note, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1976).
2. See Discussion Draft of Proposed Regulation § 1.61-16, 40 Fed. Reg. 41119
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Discussion Draft], withdrawn in I.R.S. News Release
No. 1735, [1977-791 STD. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) § 6375.
3. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE FRINGE
BENEFITS, DISCUSSION DRAFr BIL AND REPORT (1979), which would add a new sec-
tion 84 to the Internal Revenue Code (see note 43 infra, discussing the text of the
proposed § 84). 1979-10 STD. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) § 6156. Throughout this paper
reference is made, alternatively, to "proposed section 84," or "section 84." In all
use of fringe benefits as compensation for services rendered 4 re-
sults in substantial tax benefit to many high salaried, high tax
bracket employees. Because many of these "percs" are not pres-
ently included in gross income, either by force of law, administra-
tive practice, or by failure of taxpayers to declare them, the
government is currently unable to reach the revenues lost by
such exclusion from the tax base.
The present status of many of these "percs" and "benes" is un-
certain, and a definitive resolution of this confused situation is
not in sight. Congress has withdrawn from the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue the authority to promulgate any final fringe
benefit regulations until June, 1981.5 The present uncertainty
stems from several factors including the failure of prior regula-
tory attempts, a belief by many that any rules drawn up by the
Service would be too restrictive, and a manifestation of congres-
sional inability (or unwillingness) to come to grips with this im-
portant issue.
This article will address the law and policy questions related to
the inclusion or exclusion from gross income of items of fringe
benefit. The cognate issue of deductibility by the employer is be-
yond this scope, and as such, will be mentioned only peripher-
ally.6 Nor will this paper discuss the nebulous category of
employee benefits that are presently allowed an explicit exclusion
from gross income.7
cases, this is not intended to be confused with existing I.R.C. § 84; the references
are always to the proposed bill.
4. Handler, Fringe Benefits and The S.E.C. Disclosure Rules, 37 N.Y.U. INST.
ON FED. TAX 31-32 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Handier].
5. Fringe Benefit Act, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 1, 93 Stat. 1275 (1979) (to be codi-
fied at 26 U.S.C. § 61).
6. President Carter has caviled against this flip-side aspect of certain fringe
benefits by labelling it the "three-martini lunch." Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1977, at 1,
col. 6. Presently, when dealing with allowable deductions for expenses incurred in
the taxpayer's trade or business that have a nondeductible feature of personal use
or gratification, an allocation under the old Cohan rule is utilized (Cohan v. Com-
missioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543 (2nd Cir. 1939)), or, to the extent it applies (and it ap-
plies very broadly), I.R.C. § 274. All section references made hereinafter are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless otherwise indicated. See also
I.R.C. § 262; Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uni-
form Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 859 (1974).
7. Maximum $50,000 of insurance, exclusion of premiums paid on group term
insurance (I.R.C. § 79); certain employee death benefits (§ 101(b)); military injury
or sickness benefits (§ 104(a)(4)); accident or health insurance benefits (§ 105);
contributions to health or accident plans (§ 106); parsonage rental value (§ 107);
meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer (§ 119); group le-
gal service plans (§ 120); moving expenses (§ 217); employer contributions to qual-
ified pension and profit sharing plans (§§ 402, 403); and employee allowances in
foreign areas (§ 912).
This paper does not discuss these items, many of which are arguably the types
of benefits that should be included in a more comprehensively based income tax
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The broad definition of "gross income," as it presently exists,
will be explored, leading to the conclusion that most fringe bene-
fits, with de minimus exceptions, are income in the statutory
sense. Thereafter will follow a brief synopsis of the current law of
fringe benefit taxation, along with a comparative examination of
the 1975 Discussion Draft of Proposed RegulationsB and the pro-
posed section 84, currently pending before the House Ways and
Means Committee.9 Finally, there will be a discussion of the tax
policy issues relating to inclusion/exclusion, followed by specific
recommendations in this area. It is submitted that the proposed
section 84 will definitely be a positive step towards clarifying
present uncertainty, provided that certain policy problems extant
in the section are corrected.
1. Fringe Benefits Defined
Virtually all non-cash economic benefits received by an em-
ployee from the employer incident to the employment relation-
ship may properly be denominated fringe benefits.10 It is
generally presumed that there is a sufficiently close nexus be-
tween lowered cash compensation for services and increased non-
cash remuneration to treat the latter as having been received in
exchange for services. The actual form may vary, including, in-
ter alia:
employer-furnished subsidized housing, daycare centers, free schools, in-
terest free loans provided to employees, free financial counseling, free
trips to conventions for families, reimbursement for or directly furnished'
free commuting, subsidized cafeteria for employees or executives, health
system (see Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, U.S. Department of the Treasury,
1977, hereinafter cited as Blueprints), because, for the present time, they are re-
moved, by virtue of Congressional grace, from the instant controversy. See also
A.B.A. Committee on Simplification, Evaluation of the Proposed Model Compre-
hensive Income Tax, 32 TAx LAWYER 563, 567 (1978) (hereinafter cited as A.B.A.
Evaluation).
8. See note 2 supra.
9. See note 3 supra. See text of proposed § 84 infra, at note 43.
10. See Handler, note 4 supra, at 31-34; Johnson, Treasury on Fringe Benefits:
To Tax or Not to Tax, 4 TAX NOTES No. 2, 3, 4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as John-
son].
11. However, in view of the broad language of such cases as Glenshaw Glass,discussed, infra at text accompanying notes 17-22, such a stringent showing, viz.,
that the benefits are received in exchange for services may not be necessary. Pre-
sumably, if the employer had a "detached and disinterested generosity" in mind,
they could be characterized as gifts excluded by virtue of I.R.C. § 102, in admit-
tedly rare cases. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); I.R.C.
§ 274(b),. allowing the employer a limited ($25) deduction for gifts made.
care services or medical expense reimbursement plans not exempt by
statute, price discounts and rebates for employees, tickets to sporting or
cultural events, and employer-paid club dues.
1 2
In an administrative sense, the Internal Revenue Service has fo-
cused on two areas of economic benefit: the fringe that is a
"product" of the employer's trade or business (e.g., air transporta-
tion provided by an airline, and discounts on the employer's own
goods) and the "indirect" fringe, such as the provision of com-
pany cars for personal, non-business use.13
As the above suggests, the proffered definition is seemingly all-
inclusive, yet exceptions may be seen to exist. Working condi-
tions such as air conditioning, lighting, comfortable (even opu-
lent) office space, and the '"psychic enjoyment" associated with
work are clearly excludable.14 Additionally, small gifts (e.g., a
Christmas ham or turkey) do not come within the general rule.15
B. Authority to Tax Benefits
1. Section 61
Gross income includes "compensation for services, including
fees, commissions, and similar items." Moreover, absent some
specific exclusion, "all income from whatever source derived" is
to be included.16 This phrase, one of the broadest inclusion sec-
tions in the Code, clearly would sweep within its purview not only
all economic benefits received in lieu of compensation, but all ac-
cessions to wealth. Indeed, the Supreme Court observed in Com-
missioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. that "this language was used by
Congress to exert in this field the 'full measure of its taxing
power.'"17 Section 61 included, as the Glenshaw Glass Court
noted, all (1) accessions to wealth, that are (2) clearly realized,
and (3) under the dominion and control of the taxpayer.
When services are compensated for by means other than
money, the regulations require that the fair market value of the
12. JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 95th CONG., 2D SESS.,
Taxation of Fringe Benefits (Staff Print 1978).
13. HEARINGS BEFORE THE TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS OF THE
HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMIrEE, 95th CONG., 2D SESS. [hereinafter cited as
TASK FORCE HEARINGS] (statement of Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy).
14. Johnson, supra note 10, at 4; Handler, supra note 4, at 31.01-2, citing 1 S.
SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 129
(1972); A.B.A. Evaluation, supra note 7, at 579-80.
15. Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17.
16. I.R.C. § 61(a) (emphasis added).
17. 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955). See also James v. U.S., 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Com-
missioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334
(1940); United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
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property received be included in gross income.18 To eliminate
one possible means of abuse, it is provided that when the em-
ployer transfers property to the employee as compensation, the
"spread" between the fair market value of the property received,
less the consideration paid (other than in services) is includ-
able.19
2. Section 83
Added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, section 83 overlaps por-
tions of section 61 and the regulations under section 61. It pro-
vides that when property that is transferable or not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture is provided in connection with the
performance of services, the spread between the value of such
property and the amount of the consideration paid is included.20
Section 83 has been relied upon, in part, to deem as includable
employer contributions to trust funds providing college expense
benefits to children of key employees. 21
Section 83 is potentially of broad application because the prop-
erty need only be transferred to someone other than the em-
ployer to be included in the employee's gross income. Thus, as
noted above, receipt of benefits by family members of the em-
ployee can trigger inclusion.22
3. Tentative Conclusion
Absent explicit statutory authorization to the contrary, sections
61, 83 (together with the regulations promulgated thereunder)
and case law have given the I.R.S. power to mandate inclusion of
all nonstatutory fringe benefits. While valid in theory, the next
section will show that through administrative inaction, court re-
luctance, honest uncertainty, and taxpayer exploitation, this ten-
tative conclusion is not borne out in today's practice.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1953).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2)(i) (1953). See also text accompanying notes 20-
21 infra, discussing I.R.C. § 83.
20. I.R.C. § 83(a).
21. Armantrout v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978), affig, 67 T.C. 996
(1977).
22. In Armantrout, the Tax Court read this correctly, in its literal sense. Id.
II. SYNOPSIS OF CURRENT LAW
A. Benefits Includable
Due to the uncertainty of whether or not many benefits should
be included, it may be more appropriate to employ a negative def-
inition that holds all benefits are includable, with the exception of
those to which Congress 23 and the Service 24 have ruled to be ex-
cludable. This is consistent with the statutory language.
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Kowalski25 provided
support for this view when it held that cash receipts by a state
trooper as meal allowances were properly included in income.
The Court ruled that because the trooper's meals were not con-
sumed on the business premises of the employer, and were not
delivered "in-kind," as required by section 119, they were includ-
able as compensation. 26 The'Court did not decide what impact, if
any, Kowalski would have on the older rule that "supper money"
is excluded if the employee performs extraordinary services for
the employer after regular hours.27 A literal reading of Kowalski
and section 119 prompts the conclusion that these are now includ-
able benefits.
There are several other situations wherein certain employee
benefits are deemed includable compensation. For example,
where the employee uses the employer's property for his own
personal, nondeductible use,28 he must include the value of the
benefit received (generally fair market value, or fair rental
23. See note 7 supra.
24. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 31-32, infra. The following are includ-
able fringe benefits: educational benefit trust distributions for children of employ-
ees (Rev. Rul. 75-448, 1975-2 C.B. 55); employer-paid FICA contributions absent
withholding from employee's income (Rev. Rul. 74-75, 1974-1 C.B. 19); payment of
employee's financial counseling fees (Rev. Rul. 73-13, 1973-1 C.B. 42); merchandise
awarded by a distributor to employees of its dealers (Rev. Rul. 70-331, 1970-1 C.B.
14); loan forgiveness (Rev. Rul. 69-465, 1969-2 C.B. 27); "tool allowances" paid to
employees (Rev. Rul. 65-187, 1965-2 C.B. 382); club member distributions to club
employees (Rev. Rul. 64-40, 1964-1 C.B. 68); compensatory bargain purchases by
employees (Rev. Rul. 62-49, 1962-1 C.B. 13); and payment of employee expenses at
a health resort (Rev. Rul. 57-130, 1957-1 C.B. 108).
25. 434 U.S. 77 (1977). See also Note, Highway Robbery: State Troopers Denied
Exclusion Under § 119-Commissioner v. Kowalski, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 253
(1978); Wasserman, Principles in Taxation of Nonstatutory Fringe Benefits, 32 TAX
LAWYER 136, 139-40 (1978). The Tax Court has also moved recently in the direction
set by Kowalski. See Fenstermaker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1978-210 (reim-
bursements for lunches, personal expenses, includable); H. Beckert, T.C. Memo
1978-903 (discount on certain property provided to employee includable).
26. However, in response to Kowalski, Congress enacted § 3 of the Fringe
Benefits Act, which provided state troopers with retroactive relief. See note 5
supra. See also new I.R.C. § 119(b) (3).
27. O.D. 514, 2 C.B. 90 (1920).
28. I.R.C. § 262. Commuting in a company owned car would be an example of
this. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(e), 1.262-1(b)(5).
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value).29 Similarly, bargain sales to employees may result in the
inclusion of the "spread" or bargain element, under Commissioner
v. LoBue,30 regulation section 1.61-2(d) (i), and section 83.
B. Items not Includable
Two hoary chestnuts from the early days of income taxation
still survive with some vitality: O.D. 51431 and O.D. 946.32 O.D. 514
excluded supper money allowances, and O.D. 946 provided an ex-
clusion for free passes given railroad employees and their fami-
lies. By direct analogy these free passes can be compared with
the receipt by an airline stewardess of free flight benefits. Yet
when the idea was promulgated in 1921, the relative value of this
exclusion was low. In contrast, current free flight benefits can be
of substantial value to the recipient.
A more important fringe benefit is the interest-free loan pro-
vided to employees (who are generally shareholders in a small,
closely-held corporation). Although the I.R.S. has viewed this in-
terest bargain as includable in income, it has consistently lost
such cases. The Tax Court has repeatedly held that the "imputed
interest deduction" that the taxpayer could claim would offset the
inclusion of the bargain element in gross income. 33 However, this
rationale assumes that the taxpayer itemizes-an assumption
29. Vierling, T.C. Memo 1969-116; Horung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428 (1967);
JOINT COMMITEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 93RD CONG., 2D SEss. EXAMINA-
TION OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S TAX RETURNS FOR 1969 THROUGH 1972 (Staff Print 1974);
Handler, supra note 4, at 31-32.
30. 351 U.S. 243 (1956). See also Rev. Rul. 62-49, note 24 supra. Small retail
discounts are not subject to withholding tax. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-1 (b) (10).
31. See note 27 supra.
32. 4 C.B. 110 (1921).
33. Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), nonacq. 1973-2 C.B. 4. See also
M. Zager v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. No. 82 (1979); Greenspun v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. No. 78 (1979); but see Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. No. 97 (1979). Dolese v.
United States 605 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1979). This is a tool used to avoid the effect of
double taxation on corporate distributions. If the loaned money had been left in
the corporation, the interest or income therefrom would have been taxed first to
the corporation, and then to the shareholder-employee when received as a divi-
dend. Thus, the taxpayer has successfully avoided two taxes; and, at the rate of
20% (the prime rate at the time of this writing), the interest benefit is quite sub-
stantial. The interest free loan can sometimes be deemed a "constructive divi-
dend," that is includable under I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7) and 301(c)(1). B. BrrrKER & J.
EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7.05-
et. seq. (4th ed. 1979); Creel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. No. 97 (1979); Dolese v.
United States, 605 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1979).
perhaps technically incorrect. 34
Further exclusions are afforded for the small gifts that are con-
sidered de minimus for accounting and administrative purposes.
These also include in-kind Christmas gifts,35 but not large cash
bonuses. Rarely would these constitute gifts excludable under
section 102, because under current practice the employer does not
have the required "detached and disinterested generosity." In-
stead, the bonus is based upon either the employee's productivity
during the year, or upon the business's performance as an incen-
tive to the employee to work harder the following year.
Amounts received as moving expenses are required to be in-
cluded in employee income, 36 but may then be deducted directly
from gross income as a business expense if the employee meets
the tests and falls within the dollar limitations set forth in the
Code.37
By far, the largest category of benefits that are in effect "non-
taxable" are those in the broad spectrum listed above. The major-
ity of employees do not perceive these fringes as "income" in the
same manner as the Service does; rather, the free parking space,
lunch, or daycare facility is viewed as a "right" associated with a
particular job. The better the position, the greater number of
"rights" that accrue.
III. THE 1975 DIsCUSSION DRAFT
A. General
The 1975 Discussion Draft of Proposed Regulation 1.61-1638 en-
joyed a relatively short life. Proposed on September 5, 1975, it
was withdrawn on January 13, 1977, after extensive discussion.
This demise was due to a number of factors acting in concert, in-
cluding intra-departmental disputes between the Secretary and
the Commissioner, overall Department preoccupation with the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, strong criticism from both the academic
and business communities, and the change of Administrations in
1977.39 The rules and examples contained in the Draft were rea-
34. For this criticism of the "imputed deduction" rationale, see Friedrich,
Fringe Benefits: Compensation Techniques and Principles, 35 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX 1555, 1556 (1977). This also assumes that the imputed deduction is not disal-
lowed by I.R.C. § 265(2).
35. See note 15 supra. However, if cash were given to purchase these goods,
the amount received would be included in gross income.
36. I.R.C. § 82.
37. I.R.C. § 217. This is an "above the line" deduction, so that itemization is
not required; hence, it is available to more taxpayers. See I.R.C. § 62(8).
38. See Discussion Draft, note 2 supra.
39. Wrote Calvin Johnson:
The draft, while it indicates Treasury thinking, [had] no official status. It
[Vol. 7: 627, 1980] Proposed Section 84
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sonably liberal, and were structured with practical considerations,
rather than precise philosophical distinctions, in mind. Many of
the fringe benefits theoretically subject to inclusion under sec-
tions 61 and 83 would have survived the lower level of scrutiny
provided in the Discussion Draft, thereby escaping the income
tax.
A brief summary and discussion of the criteria contained in the
Draft will follow because of its close similarity to the currently
proposed section 84. As will be noted later however, section 84 is
in some respects less strict than the Discussion Draft.
B. Test for Exclusion
The Draft established a three-tiered test. Under this test, the
taxpayer could escape inclusion in his gross income if he was able
to establish that he came within the scope of any one of the three
"tiers."
1. First Tier
At this level of review, the taxpayer would have to establish
three elements to avoid inclusion: (1) the benefit provided must
be for a purpose primarily related to business use and not per-
sonal consumption, and must be owned by or under the control of
the employer; (2) the employer must have incurred no substantial
additional cost in providing the benefits; and (3) the benefit was
made available to a reasonable classification of employees, but
could not be a class consisting primarily of the most highly com-
pensated.40
2. Second Tier
Failure to establish coverage under the first tier led the tax-
payer to the second tier, where inclusion or exclusion would have
been determined by examination of "all the facts and circum-
was signed by outgoing Assistant Secretary Frederic J. Hickman shortly
before he returned to his Chicago law firm. It was not signed by Commis-
sioner Alexander of the Internal Revenue Service, as a proposed regula-
tion would be, and the IRS has directed its agents not to follow it as to
pending cases (Citation omitted).
See note 10 supra, at 3. For an interesting discussion of this inter-agency squab-
ble, written by the man whose signature appears on the Draft, see Hickman, The
Outlook for Fringe Benefits, 29 U. So. CAL. INST. ON FED. TAx 459 (1977).
40. Discussion Draft, note 2 supra, at § 1.61-16(a) (1)-(3).
stances." The following factors, no one of which was to be con-
trolling, would have indicated that the benefit should be excluded:
(1) The cost incurred by the employer in providing the benefit is not
identifiable or significant in relation to the fair market value of the benefit
received by the employee.
(2) The personal use occurs during, immediately before, or immediately
after working hours at or near the business premises of the employer and
has a proximate relation to work performed by the employee.
(3) The benefit is provided to employees generally or to reasonable clas-
sifications of employees determined, . . . [by] work, seniority, or similar
factors ... but not... the most highly compensated....
(4) The benefit is similar to a service or other benefit which is commonly
provided by [government entities] . . .not readily available to the em-
ployees because of the location of their [work].
(5) The benefit accommodates an important requirement of the em-
ployer or relieves the employer of significant expense or inconvenience.
(6) The benefit is reimbursement of a greater than usual item of expense
which was incurred by the employee for a purpose thought primarily per-
sonal but which is incurred because a business requirement of the em-
ployer prevented the employee from obtaining the item in the ordinary
manner.
(7) The benefit is provided primarily to insure the employee's safety by
protecting against significant risk arising from the employment relation.
(8) The benefit is not a substantial amount absolutely or in comparison
to the employee's stated compensation.
(9) The item generally is not thought of as constituting compensation in-
cludable in gross income.4 1
3. Third Tier
The final tier established a de minimus test, covering those
items so small as to have made accounting for them unreasonable
or impractical, in comparison with the revenues that would have
been generated by their inclusion.4 2
C. Valuation
The amount determined to be includable in gross income was to
have been at the fair market price of the benefit received, less any
consideration paid. This was consistent with the valuation rules
under sections 61 and 83.
IV. PROPOSED SECTION 84
A. Inclusion
The newly proposed section 8443 (currently pending before the
House Ways and Means Committee) states that unless the tax-
41. Id., at § 1.61-16(b)(1)-(9).
42. Id., at § 1.61-16(c).
43. See note 3 supra. The proposed bill reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
SEC. 84. FRINGE BENEFITS.
(a) General Rule.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, gross
income of an employee includes an amount equal to the aggregate value
[Vol. 7: 627, 1980] Proposed Section 84
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payer comes within its parameters, the fair market value of all
fringe benefits received on account of services performed by the
employee are to be included in gross income," except as other-
wise provided in the Code.
B. Exclusion
As with the Draft, the proposed section 84 also establishes a
three-tiered filter to determine excludability, and further autho-
rizes the Secretary to prescribe regulations designed to exclude
other benefits from gross income. 45
1. First Tier: Section 84(b)
If the taxpayer satisfies all of the three elements in section
84(b), an exclusion is allowed. First, the benefit must be made
of the fringe benefits received by any person during the taxable year on
account of services performed by such employee.
(b) General Guidelines for Excluding Certain Fringe Benefits.-Gross
income does not include the value of any fringe benefit if all of the follow-
ing requirements are met:
(1) the fringe benefit is made available to employees generally, or
to a reasonable classification of employees,
(2) no substantial incremental cost is incurred in providing such
benefit, and,
(3) in the case of any employee, the total value of all fringe bene-
fits received during the taxable year on account of services performed
by the employee for any person is not substantial either in absolute
terms or in comparison to the employee's total compensation from
such person.
For purposes of paragraph (3), the value of any fringe benefit to which
subsection (c) or (d) applies shall not be taken into account.
(c) Certain Other Fringe Benefits Excluded From Gross Income.-
Gross income does not include the value of any fringe benefit if any one of
the following requirements is met:
(1) Benefits provided to facilitate the furnishing of services.-Such
benefit is made available primarily for the purpose of facilitating the
employee's performance of the services and substantially all of the
use of such benefit can reasonably be expected to be in connection
with the performance of such services.
(2) De minimus amounts.-The value of such benefit is so small as
to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracti-
cable.
(d) Section Not to Apply to Benefits Covered by Other Sections of
This Chapter ....
44. See note 43 supra, proposed § 84(a). Under the proposed language, the
continuing problem of gift vs. compensation will be perpetuated. See also note 11,
supra.
45. See note 3 supra, proposed § 84(c) (3). A literal reading of this subsection
would bar the Secretary from issuing regulations that could include benefits.
available to all employees or to reasonable classifications of em-
ployees. Second, the employer must incur no substantial incre-
mental cost in providing the benefit. Finally, the total value of
benefits received during the year cannot be substantial either (1)
in absolute terms, or (2) when compared to normal compensation.
This will be referred to as the "aggregation/comparison" test.
2. Second and Third Tiers: Sections 84(c) (1) & (2)
Under the second tier, if the benefit is used to further the em-
ployee's performance of services, and substantially all of it is so
used, then no inclusion in income results. The third tier makes
provision for the exclusion of de minimus amounts, similar to that
provided in the Discussion Draft.
C. Valuation
Fair market valuation is also adopted in proposed section 84.
V. DISCUSSION DRAr AND PROPOSED SECTION 84 COMPARED
A. General
At first reading, many of the provisions in the two proposals ap-
pear similar.46 There are, however, several important points of
departure. Proposed section 84 suffers from various deficiencies,
many of which will be commented upon in the following section
of this article.
Proposed section 84 begins with a better statutory presumption:
all fringe benefits are included, unless made expressly exempt.
The Discussion Draft contained no such presumption. Section 84
is therefore more consistent with section 61 and existing case
law.4 7 Proposed section 84 would provide the Commissioner with
a more specific congressional declaration which would augment
the presently considerable language of section 61. In this manner,
section 84 would, in its own right, be able to deal with non-quali-
fied fringe benefits.
46. Apparently, tax history may be about to repeat itself:
Seciion 83 of the Code dealing with property transferred in connection
with the performance of services was partially generated by the publica-
tion of proposed regulations [Prop. Reg. § 1.421-6, Fed. Reg. 15870, Oct. 26,
19681 amending the regulations dealing with the tax treatment of property
received subject to substantial restrictions .... [T]he publication of pro-
posed regulations resulted in a storm of protest from taxpayers and ...
the proposed regulations were withdrawn-only to reappear shortly there-
after in the form of legislation.
Warble, Taxation of Fringe Benefits and Perquisites, 36 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx
693, 708 (1976).
47. See text accompanying notes 16-23 supra.
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B. De Minimus Amounts
The language is virtually identical in both proposals, represent-
ing a widely accepted view that some relatively minor benefits
ought to be exempted. Even some of the harsher critics of the
Draft agree with this.48 The accounting and administrative bur-
dens both on employers and upon the Service would be too high
when compared to the marginal increase in revenue that would
be generated. This is consistent with existing law, and at the
threshold presents no serious policy violation.
Notwithstanding, neither the Discussion Draft nor the proposed
section 84 call for examination of de minimus fringes on an aggre-
gate basis.49 Itemizations of comparatively nugatory fringe bene-
fits by category may appear substantially different when
aggregated on a per employee basis.50 Thus, where many bene-
fits, all of them considered small, are provided to a single individ-
ual or group of individuals, it is possible that an unreasonable
amount of paid-for personal consumption is being exempted from
the tax base. When the recipient is a highly compensated em-
ployee, the potential for greater abuse exists. Therefore, some
form of interrelationship between the aggregation/comparison
test of proposed section 84(b) (3) and the de minimus rule is nec-
essary.5 1
An overly liberal interpretation of this section could result in
abuses unless workable standards are established. A subsidiary
consideration is that workable standards will be needed to give
the de minimus rule teeth that can bite if the need arises. If in-
terpreted and/or enforced in an excessively liberal manner, sig-
nificant amounts of income may thereby be exempted from the
base. Hopefully, when the point is reached where aggregate de
minimus exemption amounts have crossed the threshold into
more substantial benefits, the reason for the rule would cease
(because accounting for them would then be practical), and so
too should the rule.
48. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 27. See also A.B.A. Evaluation, note 7
supra, at 582.
49. See text accompanying note 43 supra, discussing § 84. Note that § 84(b),
last sentence, specifically exempts de minimus amounts (§ 84(c) (2)) from the ag-
gregation/comparison test of § 84(b) (3). This is a loophole in utero.
50. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 27, citing MACAULEY, FRINGE BENEFITS AND
THEIR FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT 35 (1959).
51. For one such proposal, see A.B.A. Evaluation, supra note 7, at 582.
C. Treatment of High-Bracket Taxpayers
One of the persistent problems associated with fringe benefits
is that they are worth more to the higher bracket taxpayer.52 The
Discussion Draft specifically addressed this problem by including
a nondiscrimination requirement in the first element of the first
tier of exclusion.5 3 However, proposed section 84 does not accom-
plish the same goal directly. Instead, it would attempt to obtain
the approximate result in a more oblique manner, by relying upon
the aggregation/comparison test.5 4
One of the salutary features of proposed section 84 is that
should the employee run afoul of this test, the total value of all
fringe benefits received would be included, not just the excessive
amounts. The potential harshness of this rule is mitigated by the
requirement that the excessive benefits must first be "substan-
tial." That would appear to be a higher burden upon the govern-
ment than, for example, an "unreasonable" standard would be.
This may be playing with semantics, but the language used in
proposed section 84(b) (3) is fairly vague in this respect. For ex-
ample, it might be possible that a large fringe benefit that is an
item of personal consumption may not be considered substantial
under the facts if the recipient is a corporate executive with a
huge salary, and the absolute value of the benefit is not deemed
too substantial. In contrast, this same benefit could be included
in the employee's income were he not so highly paid or, were the
standard lowered to one of reasonableness.
If proposed section 84 were enacted in its present form, resort
would have to be made to the courts to clarify this issue, while
the language of the Discussion Draft and examples 5 and 9
therein provided clearer insight, despite their liberal tenor.
A nondiscriminatory requirement should be inserted into the
first-tier test of section 84. This would provide that the classifica-
tion of employees receiving benefits could not be a class primarily
consisting of the most highly compensated.
D. Commitment to Business Purpose
In this area proposed section 84 is also less meritorious than
the Discussion Draft because the latter would have required a
52. See note 4 supra; and text accompanying notes 73-83 infra.
53. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, at § 1.61-16(a)(1). See also Johnson, supra
note 10, at 24-26.
54. See note 43 supra, text proposed § 84(b) (3). Thus, a very highly compen-
sated employee would be able to receive large amounts of benefits in comparison
to his total salary; but when such amounts became substantial in the aggregate,
the employee would no longer be shielded by the proposed section 84.
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commitment to business purpose if the fringe were to be ex-
cluded, while the former has no such requirement. If Congress is
to define parameters for exclusion of fringe benefits, one of the
theoretical underpinnings 55 ought to be that the benefit provided
has an independent, legitimate business purpose, so that it is not
solely an item of personal consumption. The Draft would have
provided that the benefit be properly related to the employer's
trade or business, and primarily unrelated to personal use or con-
sumption. Any item of benefit that safely ties up at the first tier
of section 84 is virtually immune from taxation.
This creates a serious potential for misuse. For example, if an
employer makes available on the weekends an automobile to an
employee whose job does not otherwise (on business principles)
merit the use of a car, then the rental value of the car would be
excluded under proposed sections 84(b) or (c) (2).56 Yet, the pri-
mary purpose of such use is undeniably personal consumption.
This is clearly an incorrect and improper result. If enacted in its
present form, it might be fair to assume that a business require-
ment will be engrafted onto section 84 as judicial gloss. However,
the courts may defer to Congress on this (as having spoken by si-
lence), and decline to read such a requirement into the statute.
E. Cost Limitations
Both sets of proposed rules require that at the first tier of exclu-
sion the provision of the benefit may not result in substantial ad-
ditional costs to the employer. This limitation is designed to
minimize the total amount on money expended on fringe benefits,
as well as to avoid the concommitant economic dislocations
should the total amount of goods and services utilized in provid-
ing these benefits be too substantial. In example 1 of the Discus-
sion Draft, the use by a stewardess of a free stand-by flight is not
an includable fringe benefit because the otherwise vacant seat
has no substantial additional cost to the airline.
The examples provided in the Discussion Draft referred to di-
rect, out-of-pocket costs as the standard of measurement. It has
been urged that "opportunity costs" and other concepts imported
from the field of economics might better assess the true cost of
55. See Wasserman, supra note 25, at 138; see also text accompanying notes
28-29 supra, and 94-95 infra.
56. However, resort might be made to I.R.C. § 262, to deny portions of the em-
ployer's claimed deduction.
the employer.57 These costs are generally incapable of calculation
with any degree of certainty,5 8 and because of their inherently
speculative nature could lead to taxpayer confusion, noncompli-
ance, and problems of equity in enforcement. There are, however,
at least two areas where such costs are more susceptible of accu-
rate measurement, and perhaps should be taken into account.
1. Bargain Sales
The cost to the provider can quite often be readily calculated
when a bargain sale is made to an employee. Presently, when an
employee receives goods or services from an employer in a dis-
counted sale, the bargain element is includable in income with de
minimus exceptions.5 9 Under the Discussion Draft (example 3)
and proposed section 84, this rule would be changed because as-
suming the amount is not de minimus, the employer has merely
foregone the additional income from a retail sale.
Economic distortions may occur under such a rule, as compen-
sation is taken in-kind at no tax cost in the form of bargain
purchases.60 A separate rule should be appended to section 84 so
that when an employer provides goods or services at a discount,
that he is in the trade or business of selling and the bargain ele-
ment (with de minimus exceptions) will be included in gross in-
come. As an example, employee discounts provided to reasonable
classifications of employees as a statutorily fixed percentage of re-
tail cost could be allowed free of inclusion. This should control
foreseeable and undesireable excesses, and is reasonably consis-
tent with existing law.
2. Interest-Free Loans
This type of benefit lends itself to a reasonably accurate deter-
mination of the bargain element: that being the difference be-
tween the interest paid (if any) and the prevailing interest rate
for that type of loan in the area or community in which the bor-
rower resides.
57. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 10, at 23.
58. Id. Mr. Johnson propounds that free flights, even if no other ready and
willing takers are available for the empty seats, have opportunity costs: attractive
women are drawn away from other (perhaps more vital) industries to the airline
industry because of such flights. This assertion may have some validity, but the
question remains whether such a cost should be recognized by tax law.
59. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra; Rev. Rul. 62-49, 1962-1 C.B. 13.
60. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 23. See also text accompanying notes 87-93
infra.
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VI. TAX POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Fringes Are Income
1. Tax Definition
Under present, law the general rule is that most nonstatutory
fringe benefits are includable in the gross income of the employee
who receives them.6 1 This is based upon the compensatory, per-
sonal nature of the economic benefit derived, as well as the clear
realization of gain. The employee has received stock, transporta-
tion, food, lodging, goods, or other economic benefits at either no
cost or at a reduced cost, and strict application of such cases as
Glenshaw Glass62 and Fenstermaker63 would require that these
items be included.
2. Economic Definition
It is even clearer that under the well known Haig-Simons 64 defi-
nition of income (adopted in the 1977 Treasury Blueprints65 ) a
fringe is an item of "income." This defines income as the sum of
consumption during an accounting period plus increase in net
worth during that same period. While generally irrelevant 66
under the Internal Revenue Code, this definition further rein-
forces the view that such exclusions are impure deletions from a
comprehensive tax base. It logically follows from this definition,
that all of the currently excluded statutory fringe benefits are "in-
come;" at least in the economic, if not tax sense, of the word.67
3. Initial Effects of Exclusion
There are many positive and negative effects of benefit exclu-
sion with which Part VI of this article will be concerned. Two
bear mentioning at the outset: erosion of the tax base and tax-
payer uncertainty or noncompliance.
First, exclusion of fringe benefits significantly reduces the in-
61. See text accompanying notes 16-23 supra.
62. See note 17 supra.
63. See note 25 supra.
64. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
65. Blueprints, supra note 7, at 3.
66. In criminal tax cases, however, this definition plays an important role in
the "net worth" theory of prosecution. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 125
(1954).
67. As mentioned before, an exploration of the wisdom of excluding these
items is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally note 7 supra.
come tax base.68 This infers that (1) many people are not bearing
their fair share of the tax burden, and (2) they are in effect shift-
ing that burden to other taxpayers. This shift occurs as "income"
is deleted from the base. If all nonstatutory fringes were taxed as
income, this would broaden the base against which the section 1
rates are applied. Theoretically, higher rates are required when
the base is narrowed, to generate the same amount of income as
would be the result if lower rates had been applied against a
larger base. Therefore, exclusion of fringe benefits necessitates
higher rates for everyone, but the effect of this is that taxpayers
who do not receive such benefits must generally make up the dif-
ference. It has been argued that by broadening the tax base, the
government could reduce the rates while maintaining the same
general level of revenue intake.69
Second, there is considerable confusion among taxpayers and
their counsel as to whether or not many of these items should be
included. There is often a marked difference between the theory
of Glenshaw Glass and the actual amounts put down on Form
1040.70 This frustrates several important goals of the tax system.
The amount of tax cannot be determined under our system of
self-assessment with a high degree of accuracy, thereby creating
inefficiency and uncertainty. This is borne out by the fact that
the ultimate resolution may turn, in individual cases, upon
whether or not an audit is conducted.71 Fringes excluded on
unaudited returns may be included in audited returns, thereby
raising problems of equity in enforcement. Taxpayer morale is
affected to the degree that lower and middle income taxpayers
perceive that the highly compensated are given greater leeway
with their fringes. Compliance is vitiated when "close calls," or
even clearly incorrect judgments are encouraged in the absence
of reasonably defined rules.
An income tax that included the value of all fringe benefits, cou-
pled with well defined exceptions justifiable on policy grounds,
would significantly neutralize the above difficulties. However, to
68. The A.B.A. Section on Taxation has put the present annual value of these
statutory and nonstatutory benefits at $100,000,000,000. A.B.A. Evaluation, supra
note 7, at 577.
69. Id., at 577-78. See also Blueprints, supra note 7, at 2; Blum, The Tax Expen-
diture Approach Seen Through Anthropological Eyes, Vol. 8 TAx NOTES no. 23 at
699, 701 (1979).
70. This section assumes a good faith doubt as to inclusion, and cannot possi-
bly be relevant to a taxpayer who "knows better." For several excellent discus-
sions and essays on the professional responsibility duties of tax counsel when
rendering advice on such borderline questions, see PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (B. Bittker ed. 1970).
71. For a discussion of this, and the Commissioner's position on abuse cases,
see generally Fensterinaker, note 25 supra.
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the extent that the allowed exceptions are either unjustifiably
broad or unduly vague, successful correction of these problems
will be substantially impaired. Proposed section 84 suffers, in
part, from both of the above defects, as discussed earlier.72 It is
not irretrievably defective, and hopefully can be rewritten in the
legislative process to remove these objections.
B. The Problems of Equity
1. Vertical Equity
The attainment of vertical equity between taxpayers as a goal
of tax policy requires that income attributable to taxpayers in the
higher brackets should be taxed at progressively higher rates
than income attributable to lower bracket taxpayers. This has
generally worked in practice, so that in 1975 taxpayers in the high-
est quarter of adjusted gross income contributed 72% of all taxes
paid, while those in the bottom 50% of adjusted gross income paid
only 7% of all taxes.7 3
Vertical equity may be frustrated when, for example, an em-
ployee in the 50% bracket receives a yearly free parking space
with a fair market value of $600, and the employee's secretary,
who similarly parks next to him, is in the 25% bracket. If taxed to
the boss, the fringe would cost him $300 in additional taxes, while
the secretary would have a tax cost of only $150. Each has re-
ceived an item that, under current law, probably ought to be in-
cluded; and when excluded, this benefit has inured to each
without being subjected to the applicable progressive rate. The
boss has received the better deal, since his equivalent benefit
would have had a higher tax cost if included.74
It is submitted that undue attention has been given to this
topic: it is a necessary corrollary to the progressive rate structure
that exclusions have greater tax significance as one ascends the
brackets. The fact that both of the above-mentioned individuals
have received the same in-hand economic benefit of $600 is fre-
quently overlooked. Additionally, merely because a benefit has
the indicia of income in the economic sense does not necessarily
72. See text accompanying notes 48-60 supra.
73. Roberts, Disguising the Tax Burden, HARPERS, March 1978 at 32.
74. Of course, if the boss is a member of a suspect class, this benefit might dis-
appear on audit.
mean that for tax purposes, it must be characterized as income.7 5
Further, where similar benefits are received by two individuals
with widely separated marginal rates, the benefit itself, and the
tax that would be paid on it if included, are a larger percentage of
normal compensation to the lower bracket taxpayer than they are
to the higher bracket recipient. This serves to minimize the ad-
verse effect on vertical equity, because the benefits received have
a greater percentage value (vis a vis salary) for those in the mid-
dle-to-lower brackets. Over-concentration on the tax benefit re-
ceived by the highly compensated taxpayer does not adequately
reveal that a greater percentage benefit has been conferred upon
the secretary.
It is almost universally assumed that the preponderance of non-
statutory benefits inure to the benefit of the highly compen-
sated,7 6 thereby magnifying the apparent lack of vertical equity.
The Discussion Draft was sensitive to this, and at the first tier, re-
quired that the fringe could not be one principally provided to
such persons, prior to excluding the benefit.7 7 Proposed section
84, as noted above,78 probably does not go far enough in this re-
gard because it would rely on the aggregation/comparison test to
catch these abuses, and does not have a nondiscrimination provi-
sion.
Quite possibly, the magnitude of such abuses in the area of
fringes provided to the highly compensated have been exagger-
ated. Many of the current statutory benefits are available in gen-
eral terms to all employees regardless of their income level.7 9
Nonstatutory fringe benefits, such as employee discounts, daycare
centers, supper monies, and cafeteria privileges, not exempt
under section 119 are being received by many who are not in the
higher brackets. In fact, most of the people who utilize these
services and benefits are those in the middle and lower rungs of
the income ladder.80 This is partially reinforced by the testimony
of labor leaders before the House Task Force that examined pro-
posed section 84: they regard non-cash compensatory benefits as
75. If the Haig-Simons definition of income is used, the boss still has an item
of "income" which by exclusion has given him a tax benefit superior to the secre-
tary's. See note 64 supra. See also Note, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1141, 1142-43 (1976).
76. Halperin, supra note 6, at 859; Johnson, supra note 10, at 24. See also Dis-
cussion Draft, note 2 supra.
77. See text accompanying note 40 supra. However, some of the examples
provided in the Draft that excluded certain benefits dealt with highly compen-
sated individuals, and were severely criticized in Johnson, note 10 supra, at 25, as
being unnecessarily liberal.
78. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
79. See note 7 supra.
80. Roberts, supra note 73, at 32.
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an important and substantial benefit to their rank and file mem-
bers.81
The question as to whether or not lower-paid workers prefer
cash compensation to non-cash benefits is in dispute.82 In any
event, if such benefits were required to be included in their in-
come under either section 61 or under a too-restrictive fringe ben-
efit section, they would probably find it more difficult to pay the
additional tax due. Non-cash benefits generally do not increase
ability-to-pay,83 and these workers may find that inclusion works
to their detriment. On the other hand, the highly compensated
will not have had their ability to pay significantly reduced by in-
clusion. This should be kept in mind because a dramatic shift in
the tax treatment of the benefits that are currently being received
by wage earners may have a dislocative effect.
In summary, the cumulative impact of exclusion on vertical eq-
uity has probably been exaggerated. If proposed section 84 is
amended to be nondiscriminatory, and the aggrega-
tion/comparison test is lowered to a standard of "reasonable-
ness," so that disproportionate benefits will not redound to the
highly compensated, then the remaining incidental effects on ver-
tical equity may well be acceptable.
2. Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity postulates that two individuals with equal in-
comes should be taxed in a similar manner. The exclusion of
fringe benefits contributes to varying degrees of horizontal ine-
quity. Consider the case of A and B: A has earned income of
$20,000; and B has earned income of $15,000, but has additional ec-
onomic income consisting of fringe benefits (nontaxable, or not
taxed) totalling $5,000. Both A and B have "income" of $20,000,
yet A will calculate his rate on the full $20,000, while B will apply
a lower marginal rate to only $15,000.84
Were all benefits required to be included, this inequity would
81. Task Force Hearings, note 13 supra (statement of Louis B. Knecht, Secre-
tary-Treasurer of the Communications Workers of America, Sept. 20, 1978). They
are also important and substantial benefits to the labor bosses.
82. Johnson, supra note 10, at 24.
83. Except, of course, to the extent that personal expenditures that would be
incurred anyway are paid for by the fringe benefit, which might then free other
income for payment of the additional tax.
84. This creates an overlap with vertical inequity, because with the same total
amount of income, B is now in a lower marginal bracket than A.
not have occurred, since all income would have been fully taxed.
As exceptions are made to this strict rule, it is inevitable that cer-
tain amounts of inequity will result. However, under a program of
partial exclusion, more employees will demand more fringe bene-
fits,85 with the result that a gradual leveling may take place. Just
as exempt pension plans (and other benefits excluded by statute)
have played an increasingly important role in compensation, so
too would non-cash benefits.86 When and if Congress acts to set-
tle the current dust storm surrounding fringe benefit taxation,
then laborers can be expected to call for a more broadly based ex-
tension of these benefits, thereby reducing both the incidence and
severity of horizontal inequity.
C. Tax Neutrality
In an idyllic, tax-free world, economic decisions would be made
in disregard of the oddities and vagaries of the Internal Revenue
Code. To the extent that the inclusion/exclusion of fringe bene-
fits has a direct impact on decision making, the goal of tax neu-
trality is proportionately sacrificed. It is argued that if proposed
section 84 is enacted, the law may move closer to the attainment
of tax neutrality than the present, jumbled state of affairs allows.
1. Benefit vs. Compensation
Wages paid, and most non-cash benefits are expenditures de-
ductible by the employer; generally the employer has no substan-
tial tax incentive for providing one or the other.87 Employees,
however, must include cash compensation in income, and, as dis-
cussed above, many items of non-cash remuneration. Since most
nonstatutory fringe benefits are not included in practice (and no
withholding is made at the source), employees will opt in many
circumstances for such benefits.88 This is of course aggravated
when the employee is in a high tax bracket.
It is widely assumed that employers always provide non-cash
compensation in response to employee demands for tax-free ben-
efits. However, it may be too broad of an assertion to state that
85. See note 81 supra.
86. The problems that are connected with this are discussed in the text ac-
companying notes 87-97 infra.
87. However, see MACAULEY, supra note 50, at 56, for an example of how "gain"
is sometimes accrued by the employer as non-cash compensation is gradually in-
creased.
88. The point at which this theoretically becomes desirable is when "the re-
duction in utility from consuming [non-cash items of compensation] rather than
other goods does not exceed the increase in utility available from using the tax
saving to purchase additional quantities of these or other goods and services." Id.
at 55.
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all benefits are in lieu of compensation, so that addition of the
value of the benefit to the employee's actual wage would be an
amount equal to what the true wage would be in all cases. The
employer receives definite benefits from an enhanced physical
plant that includes free parking, cafeteria, daycare centers, and
ultimately, contented employees. To this extent, benefits are not
invariably in lieu of cash compensation.
Nevertheless, the tax temptation is strong. The Discussion
Draft had this in mind and would have required that the item had
no substantial additional cost to the employer. 89 Proposed section
84 retains this test, and has added the aggregation/comparison
test.90 Where the benefit received rises to the level of (1) result-
ing in substantial incremental costs to the employer, or (2) being
substantial on an absolute basis, or in comparison to the em-
ployee's salary, then inclusion would be required.
Once this segment of section 84 has been embellished with judi-
cial and administrative interpretation, it is quite possible that the
current trend away from cash compensation to benefit compensa-
tion will be checked. Primarily this would result from the fact
that the section does not merely tax the excess of a substantial
fringe over a reasonable fringe, but instead includes the whole
value of all nonqualified benefits.9 1 This would operate to place
an upper limit on benefits that can be received tax-free, whereas
no such limits presently exist. It would be in the employee's self-
interest to see that the benefits he or she is to receive will not run
afoul of the enumerated tests. A lower level of tax-free benefits is
superior to a higher level that runs the risk of sweeping all bene-
fits into income. When wages and salaries are increased, benefits
may also be raised, but not to the point where they are too sub-
stantial in the aggregate.
In this article, it has been recommended that Congress consider
lowering the proposed standard of substantiality to one of unrea-
sonableness, for purposes of the aggregation/comparison test.
This would create a stronger incentive to design a fringe benefit
program with a lower benefit-to-compensation ratio than present
89. See Discussion Draft, supra note 2, at § 1.61-16(a)(1)-(2).
90. See text accompanying notes 52-60 supra.
91. See text accompanying note 54 supra. This penalty feature is harsh, but
may serve as an excellent deterrent to widespread abuse. Prior to the promulga-
tion of regulations and/or the addition of judicial interpretation, though, it would
present a real planning headache for the tax lawyer or accountant.
language allows, thereby minimizing invasions on tax neutrality
principles. Furthermore, the incorporation of a business purpose
requirement into the first tier of section 84 will establish another
disincentive to the shift away from cash to benefit compensation.
2. Misallocation of Goods and Services
Derivative of the "benefit vs. compensation" issue above is the
effect of exclusion on the allocation of goods and services. Those
that have a tax savings attached, as do fringe benefits, are pre-
sumably more attractive than others which the employee must
purchase with previously taxed income. This may be an interfer-
ence with the "normal functioning of the economic system," 92
since the employer has provided goods and services to employees
rather than on the open market, and the employee's decision to
avail himself of these items is motivated, in part, by the low tax
cost associated with them, rather than by normative economic de-
cisions. However, this is not always the case.
Neutrality is materially violated only where (1) the benefit re-
ceived would not have been ordinarily purchased by the em-
ployee absent tax savings, and (2) the employer could have made
an alternative disposition in the marketplace. First, even with the
tax savings attached, employees as a practical matter are not go-
ing to accept benefits they would not purchase generally. Self-in-
terest alone dictates that to the extent employees and employers
"collude" to avoid taxable compensation, the employees will de-
sire goods and services such as meals, parking, daycare centers,
and retail discount items that they truly want.93 Tax savings may
be a factor entering into the decision, but it is rarely, if ever, the
dispositive factor. The second objection can be met by refining
proposed section 84 so that this instance of non-neutrality will be
minimized by toughening up the cost to the employer test, and by
a special provision governing bargain sales.
The problem is far less severe when the benefits provided are
not goods or services that are an integral part (or product) of the
employer's trade or business. In these situations, there is little
significant competition with other providers of such goods and
services, and accordingly, special notice should be taken of this
fact. For example, if an employer erects an office building and
provides for underground parking, the employer is normally not
in the trade or business of renting parking spaces. When spaces
92. See MACAULEY, supra note 50, at 54. See also Johnson, supra note 10, at 22.
93. But see Johnson, supra note 10, at 24. His rather dim view of human na-
ture held that employees will "consume a lot of junk," if fringes are excluded; and
the higher the employee's tax bracket is, the more "junk," naturally, he will con-
sume because the tax benefits keep increasing.
(Vol. 7: 627, 1980] Proposed Section 84
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
are allocated to employees at either no cost or at a reduced cost,
the employer is merely acting as a conduit in providing the serv-
ice. It was never the primary intention of the employer to provide
spaces for anyone other than his employees, so that he has not re-
ally lost any retail sales. Second, while the cost to the employee
may be quite lower than that which could be had at comparable
commercial garages, convenience alone, and not tax savings,
would be the deciding factor in the decision by the employee to
utilize the parking provided by the employer.
The issue of neutrality has been encountered before when Con-
gress exempted the current statutory fringe benefits from the in-
come tax. Policy arguments outweighed the perceived intrusion
on neutrality in each of those instances, and the same arguments
can be applied by analogy to the nonstatutory benefits.
D. The Personal Element
One of the more important policy issues is that personal ex-
penses ought to be paid by taxpayers with after-tax earnings, and
should not therefore have the cost of their acquisition excluded
from the tax base. This is a concept related to the rule of nonde-
ductibility of personal expenses contained in section 262. Many of
the fringe benefits discussed in this comment can be character-
ized as items of personal expenditure. When coupled with the
fact that they are paid in lieu of compensation to a certain extent,
policy reasons argue strongly for inclusion of their value in gross
income.
One answer to this problem is that most, if not all, of the pres-
ent statutory benefits are in reality personal expenditures. 94
Thus, addition of another, albeit large, category of excluded items
is not totally inconsistent with the present policy of liberalizing
employer-provided benefits. Another answer is that conditioning
exclusion on the existence of a bona fide business purpose (which
proposed section 84 does not require) may partially satisfy this
objection.95
94. They are also "tax expenditures" as exclusions or deductions from the nor-
mative rate of income tax.
95. See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. The Case for Partial Exclusion
1. Certainty and Compliance
If proposed section 84 is adopted by Congress and is amended
to include reasonably clear standards and guidelines regarding
the permissible boundaries of exclusion (consonant with maxi-
mizing equity and neutrality), taxpayers and their counsel will
have a greater degree of certainty in the planning and reporting of
fringe benefits than under present law. This should increase tax-
payer morale and improve compliance, and will be distinctly su-
perior to the present congressional policy of repeatedly deferring
resolution of this important question.9 6
2. Simplicity
Obviously, the easiest route to attainment of simplification
would be to enforce the strict language of section 61 and case law
and to include all benefits. However, to the extent that Congress
makes a determination that exclusion of certain benefits advances
other policies, pure simplicity will have to be proportionately
abandoned. The countervailing policies of equity and neutrality
will necessitate some degree of complexity in any exclusion sec-
tion, as this article has noted in detail. To curb certain abuses,
and to forestall effects that are perceived to be dislocative and in-
equitable, special rules, exceptions, and defined parameters will
be needed. Invariably, time will add a significant body of case law
to embellish these rules. The benefits yielded by such an ap-
proach will outweigh the detriments, and can certainly be no
worse than the present, haphazard system of taxation.
Proposed section 84 is, with regard to the policy goal of simplifi-
cation, superior to the Discussion Draft. It will be recalled that at
the second tier of exclusion, the Draft resorted to a vague stan-
dard of "all the facts and circumstances." Proposed section 84
thankfully lacks such a subjective and fluid test, and has adopted
instead a modified "brightline" concept, whereby benefit inclusion
or exclusion is more clearly determinable, depending upon which
side of the statutory line the fringe falls. Tax planning, adminis-
tration, and enforcement will be facilitated by such a compara-
tively measurable standard.
3. Economic Incentives
As a substituted form of tax cut (to the limited extent nonstatu-
96. See note 5 supra; see also text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
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tory benefits are included presently), the partial exclusion of cer-
tain fringes will, in varying degrees, lower the tax cost of the
consumption of the goods and services provided by employers.
Due to the consumer nature of many of these items, this will par-
tially offset the effects of inflation, which most severely burdens
the lower and middle classes. A partial shift from cash to non-
cash compensation, if effected within reasonably prudent bounda-
ries, will additionally lower the overall tax burden of workers.9 7
To the extent that after-tax income is thereby increased, capital
formation will be encouraged because more money will be avail-
able for savings and other productive investments. This should
result in a more generalized economic stimulus, based upon the
principle that money in the hands of private citizens is better
spent than that which the government has and then spends.
4. Advancement of Equity
It has been argued98 that a tailored, partial exclusion of fringe
benefits will have a positive effect on both vertical and horizontal
equity. The tandem reasoning is that (1) a greater than imagined
participation by taxpayers of divergent backgrounds now exists,
and (2) that persons of middle-to-lower income can be expected
to receive more of these benefits in the future. To curb excesses
and abuses with the highly compensated, existing tools99 would
be augmented by the proposed rules in section 84 (hopefully
toughened prior to enactment).
5. The Political Question
It has been observed that fringe benefits on an aggregate basis
play an important role in the current practice of employee com-
pensation. If, under a mandate of full inclusion or of a too nar-
rowly drafted exclusion statute, significant amounts of previously
untaxed income were suddenly taxed, Congress would be deaf-
ened by the resultant outcry. Therefore, it is politically inconceiv-
able that Congress will not pass on proposed section 84, or on
97. This is accomplished since benefit compensation includes items of per-
sonal expense, thereby releasing for use in other areas an equivalent amount of
after-tax income that otherwise would have been spent on such expenses.
98. See text accompanying notes 73-86 supra.
99. Denial of deductions: under I.R.C. § 162 as lavish, extravagant, or unrea-
sonable; under § 274 as non-qualified and/or unsubstantiated; and under § 262 as
personal. Inclusion in income under Fenstermaker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
1978-210, and Armantrout v. Commissioner, 78-1 U.S.T.C. 9232 (7th Cir. 1978).
substantially similar legislation, and exempt many of the present
programs from taxation. Unfortunately, this same political pres-
sure may severely hamper efforts to amend section 84 in the legis-
lative process.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that at the very time when
the political community is discussing "tax reform" the searching
out of new items to be included into the base receives little com-
ment; whereas the academic reformers generally speak in these
terms. If the fringe benefit rules in section 84 are enacted with a
bias against the highly compensated and with safeguards against
economic distortions, academic reformers will have been left ar-
guing for a tax increase-a singularly insular position.
B. Summary
Proposed section 84 is a step in the proper direction toward a
more coherant, equitable, and practical policy in the taxation of
fringe benefits. If amended to cover some of the contingencies
and problems mentioned in this paper, it will be a welcome and
settling' 00 addition to the Code. By placing flexible limits upon
the maximum amount permitted to be received without inclusion,
in income, it will provide for a more ordered development in the
extension of such benefits by employers, rather than the current
pattern of unchecked growth. This may also mitigate the oc-
curance of tax neutrality violations, and eliminate clearly exces-
sive abuses by the highly compensated. Clearly, if Congress
seeks to stem the currents of controversy that surround these
particular fringe benefit policies, proposed section 84 should be
given serious consideration.
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